Introduction
Research in corporate strategy began with a case-based approach in the 1960s and 70s (Chandler, 1962 (Chandler, , 1977 Learned, Christensen, Andrews and Guth, 1969; Allison, 1971; Bowman, 1974) , but it has evolved extensively since then. As a result, corporate strategy is now an inherently interdisciplinary endeavor. Concepts from fields as diverse as anthropology, computer science, economics, mathematics, psychology and sociology (along with many others) have profitably been brought to bear on issues of how corporations make, implement and benefit from strategic decisions. Methodologically, however, current research relies chiefly on the use of observational (empirical) data, developed either from archival or primary sources. In this paper, we suggest that corporate strategy would benefit from an expansion of its current set of research methodologies. In particular, we discuss the use of experimental methods to address core strategy theories and to complement current observational approaches. This article thus is aimed at corporate strategy researchers who might be unfamiliar with experimental methods.
We argue that a greater use of laboratory experiments can address problems and limitations encountered in other methodologies, and thus aid both theory development and its testing. We highlight advantages that this method can bring, while also examining its limitations and potential pitfalls. To illustrate the concepts we introduce, we include an example of how this methodology has been used to evaluate and extend theories of behavior in a corporate strategy setting, and provide suggestions for other areas in which it might be constructively applied.
We believe that an increased adoption of experiments in corporate strategy research will bring specific and significant innovations and rewards. As discovered in fields like psychology and economics, experiments are helpful in addressing theories;
testing them and estimating their parameters. The challenges and opportunities facing corporate strategy researchers often lies in the integration and reconciliation of multiple theories from different disciplinary perspectives. Experimental methodology can be useful in distinguishing among competing theories, as it provides the ability for creative designs to unconfound their predictions. Experiments can also be helpful for theorybuilding in corporate strategy, suggesting modifications to existing disciplinary-based theories and exploring new theoretical directions efficiently. As a result, we believe that experiments have the potential to enliven the field and offer a valuable complement to the existing methodologies.
Experimental Methodology
The relationship between theory and data in the sciences has been hotly debated (see, for example, Kuhn 1970) . Most researchers agree, however, that a combination of induction (observing regularities or facts in the world and generalizing them to form theories) and deduction (using the theories to make predictions in new environments and then testing those predictions) is the basis of scientific advancement. Experiments that address theory thus have an important place in the dialectic of the scientific method.
After a theory is constructed inductively and predictions are generated from it deductively, an experiment is run to test the predictions. If the data from the experiment are not consistent with the predictions of the theory, the theory is refined, new predictions generated, and the process continues. While this dialectic is critical to the progress of science, it should be noted that experiments (or any data collection exercise) can not conclusively prove a theory. Simply because an experiment is consistent with a theory's predictions does not mean the theory is true; an alternative theory could be developed that is also consistent with the experiment's outcomes. Thus, a theory can not be proven true by any observation. This is the reasoning behind Karl Popper's falsification hypothesis, which states that empirical research can only falsify theories, not prove them. In fact, Popper argues, the ability to be falsified is exactly what makes a theory scientific rather than circular.
A. Advantages of Experiments
Many methodologies and be (and are) used to address theories and contribute to the scientific dialectic. However, experiments have a number of advantages in this endeavor. First, they provide clean, observable, dependent measures, unlike real-world data which tends to be noisy. Second, experiments can be designed without confounds, much as a physics experiment might control air pressure in measuring an atomic reaction, yielding clean independent measures as well These two advantages make experiments useful in testing the predictions of theories (either point-predictions or comparative-static predictions) or estimating theories' parameters. Third, this additional control can be used to construct laboratory conditions to separate alternate theories and predictions that might not otherwise be separable with naturally occurring data. Fourth, experiments can establish causality more convincingly than empirical data. Second, experiments can provide a direct test of theories by isolating the independent measures on which the theories rely. Many theories designed to explain field observations abstract away from other phenomenon which are present in the field.
For example, incentive problems between managers and firms' owners are not represented many acquisition theories, while they certainly exist in natural settings. An experiment can control for these other, confounding factors and test the theory itself (as we will discuss below, this is also a limitation of experiments, when the factor of interest interacts with the one being controlled). Because of this control, experiments can be used to test a theory's point-predictions, its comparative-static predictions or to estimate the parameters in the theory.
A third advantage of the experimental methodology is in its ability to reconcile competing theories. Corporate strategy researchers often assimilate theories from different source disciplines to develop new theories that integrate these multiple perspectives. Testing competing and integrative theories require data that control for many factors (see above), and situations where these theories make competing predictions. These situations are difficult to find in the field, but can be constructed in the lab. The research question we use to illustrate these ideas below, for example, fits into this category. Multiple theories make predictions which are collinear in the field, but in the lab we can construct situations which disentangle the theories' predictions and allow us to draw conclusions as to the validity and applicability of the theories in the corporate strategy setting. Lab experiments can implement unusual or rarely-observed parameter values or treatments in which the competing theories make opposite (or at least different) predictions, in a way which would not be possible using naturally-occurring data. Thus a clever experimental design can separate theories which could not be distinguished otherwise.
A fourth benefit of this methodology is that it establishes causality more conclusively than observational research or case studies. Observational research provides evidence of association between phenomena but rarely helps in establishing a causeeffect relationship. While observational research has become increasingly sophisticated in this domain (see, e.g. Granger causality and instrumental variables analyses) and leads to valuable conclusions, experimental methods can establish a more compelling case for causal relationships that are hypothesized from existing research. Often experiments involve one treatment in which an outcome or relationship is demonstrated, and a second in which it is made to disappear. This "make it go away" objective is an important one; if we remove the hypothesized cause and the effect remains, this is clear evidence against a causal link. In contrast, if the effect disappears when the cause is removed (all else held constant) this is evidence in favor of the theorized causal link.
As Schweiger and Goulet ( 2000) suggest: experimental studies "…provide us with a better understanding of causality." This methodology allows us to disentangle competing hypotheses that would be confounded in the field (van Oudenhoven and de Boerovin, 1995) , and provide for clean measures of independent and dependent variables.
These advantages make experiments a useful tool in the dialectic between corporate strategy theories and evidence. However, experiments have limitations as well.
B. Limitations of Experiments
The most salient limitation for corporate strategy is that of external validity (how much does the experiment tell us about the real world). Critics of experiments argue that since the laboratory situation is abstract and unrealistic (in that it contains fewer considerations, dimensions and confounds than the real world), no results from the lab can be used to predict behavior in the world.
We disagree. Zelditch (1961) discusses this issue in depth, in his amusingly-titled article "Can You Really Study an Army in the Laboratory?" His argument acknowledges that the laboratory setting is different than any naturally-occurring, real-world setting one is likely to find. However, he argues, the bridge between the lab and the real world is the theory being developed to explain real-world behavior and being tested in the laboratory design. Theories are developed to predict and explain real-world observations. These theories should also predict and explain behavior in laboratory settings. If they do not, it is not the fault of the experiment, but a lack in the theory.
This argument is also made by Plott (1991) There is one serious limitation from the lack of external validity, however, and that involves interaction effects. Imagine that an experiment identifies the impact of a main effect in a controlled setting; for example, the advantages of learning-by-doing within an organization in a setting without principal-agent conflicts. If the main effect (learning-by-doing) interacts with one of the omitted institutional details (principal-agent conflicts), then the results from the lab would not be applicable in the field. So, for example, learning-by-doing advantages might be present in the absence of principalagent conflicts, but in their presence, learning-by-doing advantages might disappear.
This limitation can be addressed only by carefully thinking about possible and reasonable interactions, and testing them in further experiments. Many experiments do just this; demonstrate interaction effects rather than focusing on main effects. Including the appropriate interactions in the initial design is crucial to overcoming this limitation.
We agree with Zelditch that experimental methodology can serve as an important complement to observational research, since the laboratory can act as a bridge between theory and field-work. There are three other ways that experiments and observational research can complement each other, however.
First, experiments can be combined with observational research in theory-building (inductive) exercises. In this situation, observational research identifies regularities that aren't predicted by existing theory. Experiments can then be designed to capture what researchers believe are the relevant dimensions of the field and to replicate the regularity in controlled conditions. Then, one by one, the real-world features can be eliminated (or relaxed or changed) until the regularity observed disappears or significantly weakens.
This exercise identifies the cause (or causes) of the observationally-observed regularity, and can result in theory construction.
Second, experiments can complement observational research by suggesting places to look. Collecting proprietary or archival data is often expensive and complicated, requiring years of investment and effort. Fast, inexpensive pilot experiments can be used in conjunction with a researcher's intuition to suggest what data is worth collecting.
Finally, observational research can point experimenters in the right direction.
Observational research can provide firm-level outcomes, and experiments can be designed to isolate the drivers of decisions. For example, if observational research shows that firms often make bad acquisition decisions or overpay for their acquisitions, then theories related to escalation of commitment, hubris hypotheses and principal-agent forces can be tested in a lab setting to explain such an observation (see e.g. Haunschild et al., 1994) .
Experiments have both advantages and limitations. Thus, our paper argues for the interplay not just between theory and experimental methodology, but the need for multiple methodologies to further inform theory development. When research methods that emphasize internal validity and those that emphasize external validity provide a consistent set of results, it increases not only the reliability of the outcome, but also leads to a stronger set of conclusions.
An Example
To make this previous discussion somewhat more concrete, in this section we provide an example of a research question in corporate that we have investigated experimentally. The question involves the use of "sequential strategies" by firms, i.e., whether it is better to form an alliance with another firm before acquiring it and, if so, why? This endeavor is particularly relevant in the context of distinguishing between competing theories which are confounded in the field.
Recent research in corporate strategy has seen a surge of studies on sequential investments made by firms in pursuit of new capabilities or markets, typified by alliances between firms followed by an acquisition of one partner by another (Doz, Hamel and Prahalad, 1986; Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991; Kogut, 1991; Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Anand, 1999; Hagedoorn and Sadowski, 1999; Chang and Rosenzweig, 2001; Folta and Miller, 2002) . These observational studies suggest a link between alliances and acquisitions. However, there are multiple (competing) theories that have been imported from disciplines or created within corporate strategy to explain this link.
In the first mechanism, firms select potential acquisition targets by going through the alliance process, for example, in a real options framework from finance (Kogut, 1991; Bowman and Hurry, 1993; Folta and Miller, 2001) . In this selection class of theories, the inter-firm relationship does not (necessarily) improve as a result of the alliance. Instead, firms use the alliance to observe the outcome of some exogenously-determined random variable, like the potential growth of the market or some predetermined "fit" between the two firms. Only alliances with positive realizations are transformed into acquisitions, causing a positive relationship between post-acquisition performance and previous alliance experience.
In the second mechanism, the experience of interacting in an alliance changes the behavior of the firms and causes superior coordination post-acquisition. This inter-partner learning in the alliance stage mitigates future coordination problems after the acquisition has occurred (Balakrishnan and Koza, 1993; Gulati, 1995) . In this class of theories, partner firms involved in an alliance develop superior knowledge, understanding and trust. Alternatively, the alliance interaction provides an opportunity for learning-by-doing through the development of inter-firm coordination routines (Reich and Mankin, 1984; Bleeke and Ernst, 1995) . Both of these mechanisms (inter-partner learning and routines)
can enhance post-acquisition performance.
A third perspective uses the idea of sticky routines. While alliance partners develop routines, these coordination routines are specific to alliance interaction and may not help post-acquisition coordination (Nelson and Winter, 1982; Zollo, Reuer and Singh, 2002) . In this class of theories, a key distinction between the alliance and post-acquisition stages is that the former involves interaction between two distinct firms, while latter involves interaction within a single firm. Thus, one would expect the former context to reflect cooperation as well as competition between the firms (Hamel, 1991; Anand and Khanna, 2000) , while coordination would dominate the latter context. If the routines developed in a semi-competitive situation are "sticky" (Nelson and Winter, 1982) , i.e., difficult to change, they would persist even when the context has changed to an acquisition. These routines would thus be inappropriate, and would diminish performance.
Given the differences in the causal mechanisms and implications of the above three theories, available observational evidence cannot easily distinguish between them.
(for more detail about this particular experiment see Agarwal, Anand and Croson, 2004) .
Note that two of the three theories (selection and experience), predict a positive relationship between alliances and successful acquisitions. Field data looking at postacquisition success and comparing outcomes based on whether or not there was a preacquisition alliance cannot distinguish between these two causes. But an experimental design can eliminate the selection mechanism by creating treatments in which participants are randomly assigned to acquire, rather than allowing them to choose to do so. Selection theories then predict no effect of pre-existing alliances on acquisition performance. If, on the other hand, the arguments underlying experience as the causal mechanism are valid, even after eliminating selection effects one would observe a positive effect of alliances on post-acquisition performance. Thus, our experimental design provides the ability to distinguish the predictions of competing theories.
In the context of our illustrative research question, an experiment was designed as follows. Two divisions of a firm (two subjects act as the managers making divisional decisions) interact with each other, sharing profits. A third subject represents the decision-maker in a third, external, firm that is a potential target of acquisition and who earns its own (independent) profits. When the experiment begins, the third firm is involved (or not involved) in an alliance with the two divisions. After a few initial quarters, the second firm is acquired and becomes a third division. This third division's payoffs are now also shared among the other divisions. The experimental design manipulates pre-acquisition alliance status to test if (and how) post-acquisition performance is enhanced by the existence of pre-acquisition alliance activity. Postacquisition, the experience is the same for all participants in all treatments.
The three divisions have the opportunity to engage in joint activities (which could be conceptualized as joint production, R&D, technology transfer or marketing). The success of this post-acquisition collective activity is the main dependent variable. Those involved with joint activities are told that they control resources. They can allocate these resources to activities in their own division/firm, which will generate profit privately to them. Alternately, they can allocate these resources toward firm (or alliance) activities.
These activities are nonlinear; if enough resources are allocated toward them, then the project is successful, and each affiliated party earns additional profit (note that this profit is shared when the parties are all part of the same firm). If too few resources are allocated toward them, the project fails and those resources are lost.
Participants engage in multiple rounds of interaction (described as financial quarters). The initial quarters represent pre-acquisition decisions, and involve either the two divisions only (with no alliance) or the two divisions and the outside firm (with alliance). After quarter two, participants are told that there has been an acquisition, and that one firm has acquired the other, previously-independent, firm. New parameters are introduced to represent payoffs consistent with the post-acquisition setting; for example the outside firm has become a division, and engages in profit sharing with the other two participants. However, the task of resource allocation remains the same.
This experimental allows us to separate the competing theories described above.
It eliminates selection effects as a cause of improved performance; all alliances end in acquisitions so there are no opportunities for selection. It introduces a simple, clean measure of performance which can be compared between treatments; success rate of a project and the resulting profits of the firms. Finding a negative influence of alliances suggests the existence of negative routine transfer, while a positive influence highlights the benefits of learning-by-doing.
Results from experiments like this can also be used to help develop and refine theories. For example, we may find that some groups engaging in sequential strategies outperform others. Investigating what they did to enhance learning-by-doing (or dampen negative transfer) can lead to refinements and new directions of the existing theories.
Conclusion and Further Research
This paper has outlined some advantages and limitations of the experimental method. This method has been used in many related fields, but has not yet been widely adopted in corporate strategy. In this section we discuss four areas of corporate strategy research where we believe experiments could be productively applied. These areas corporate strategy often involve a discussion or debate among perspectives. That these debates are ongoing highlights the limitations of observational methods mentioned above; the theories often make similar predictions and are thus difficult to distinguish in the field.
First, an interesting conversation has emerged between the capability, evolutionary or knowledge-based perspectives that emphasize employees' ability to work and the transactions costs, agency or game-theoretic perspectives that emphasize employees' willingness to work (e.g. see critiques of Kogut and Zander, 1993 by Love, 1995 and McFetridge, 1995 . While these theories rely on different mechanisms, ability
and willingness are exceptionally difficult to measure in the field. Where they are measurable, they are often not separable. An experiment can induce incentives for work (or not), provide information needed by employees to work (or not) and thus help in distinguishing between these alternative causes. Experiments can productively address this debate, since they circumvent some of the limitations encountered with the use of observational data.
Second, in the context of cooperative settings such as alliances, there is an interesting discussion between perspectives that emphasize social capital and networks and those that emphasize capabilities or incentives. In the world, social networks or social positions are likely to be correlated with real differences in capabilities of firms, which makes it difficult to conclude whether observed outcomes reflect effects of these capabilities or of social positions, leading to a near intractable problem of endogeneity. In a similar way as in our example above, experimental methods can be used to tease apart the effects of incentives (present or not) and social capital (present or not) in alliances.
A third area involves corporate governance. Experiments could examine a recurring question of why boards of directors and top management teams undertake strategies that are seemingly value-destroying rather than value-creating. Experimental methodology can simulate incentives and contexts faced by managers, and examine agency costs and managerial hubris as competing (or complimentary) motivations for the observed decisions.
A fourth topic involves corporate strategies related to international diversification.
For multi-national firms, the success of corporate strategies may depend on the "mental model" used by managers, which differ across nations. A controlled experiment run in different cultures would allow for the identification of these mental models. Note that this suggestion does not involve distinguishing between competing theories (as the other examples) but is instead more inductive; identifying the mental models in use and using those models to construct a theory of when international diversification is likely to be successful, and identifying strategies to improve is success.
We have emphasized the potential contributions that experimental methods can make in the field of corporate strategy. We began with the observation that experiments are already well accepted in disciplines closely related to corporate strategy. But the use of experiments need not be limited to only those domains that directly build on these disciplines; corporate strategy theories that are not typically associated with psychology or economics are also fertile territory for the use of experiments. We believe that experiments can be used to address theories, both by testing them directly (pointpredictions, comparative static predictions), by distinguishing among competing theories, and by establishing causality more convincingly than observational research can.
Experiments have limitations as well, particularly external validity, and thus must be used in combination with theory and observational research to triangulate on the truth. We have identified a number of ways that experimental and observational methods can reinforce each other as well, including theory-building and identifying promising areas to pursue. We have provided an extended example of how experiments can address competing theories in the area of acquisitions, and discuss more briefly four other areas of corporate strategy where we believe experiments can be productively applied. We encourage interested scholars to consider these (and other) areas in corporate strategy as those ripe for further research.
